Presented at the Banque de France doctoral seminar and at the AFSE 2018 annual meeting.
Does the composition of governance affect firm outcomes? We exploit the timings and thresholds of a gender quota in boards of directors and supervisory boards to causally determine the impact of a change in leadership on performance. Using a novel design and data on boards, we find that firms forced to comply with the 2011 gender quota in France increased their profit margin by 5.4 percent relative to firms with unchanged boards thereby limiting diminishing profitability. We identify a shift in their cost structure away from excessive purchasing of services such as out-sourcing and sub-contracting. The decision to only marginally increase this expenditure is more optimal as their revenue grows. We show that our effects are nearly entirely explained by the first newcomer in the board. The persistence of our estimates provide evidence for its role in updating knowledge and suggest the relevance of governance heterogeneity for performance.
Presented at the Economics of Innovation Lab of the Collège de France, the Industrial Organization seminar of KU Leuven, the 6th AFSE conference on public policy evaluation, the Royal Economic Society 2021 conference, the INSEAD brown bag seminar, the EARIE 2021 conference, the 4th IZA workshop on gender and family economics, the LIEPP internal seminar, the 19th Brucchi Luchino labour economics workshop
Work in progress